in the struggle between workers and corporations over the question o f occupational health and safety. But in this case a second feature made the confrontation all the more acrimonious. Women who, as a result o f civil rights legislation and court action, had begun to break the male monopoly over relatively high-paying blue-collar jobs were now being threatened with dism issals, demotions, or barriers to employment in the name o f fetal health. Corporate policies put forth in the name o f fetal protection echoed the recently discredited arguments o f the years when women were excluded from often better paying jobs because they were deemed to require special protection. Once again, women were to be barred from jobs that m ight com promise their capacities to bear healthy children. Once again, they were to be restricted because they bore a special obligation to future gen erations, to the " race." Responding to this challenge, a broad coalition o f fem inist, labor, civil rights, and civil liberties organizations created the Coalition for Reproductive R ights o f Workers (C R R O W ).1 " N o more W illow Islands" was the cry (Coalition for Reproductive Rights of W orkers, 1981) .
Questions o f great importance are at stake in the clash between corporate interests that have pressed for exclusionary employment policies and those groups that have opposed them. How shall society respond to the risks o f childbearing under conditions o f work-related toxicity? How shall the burdens associated with such risks be dis tributed? M ust the intrinsically private functions o f conceiving and giving birth to a child be thought o f as involving only personal obligations? Should those who benefit from the labor o f fertile workers-the owners and managers o f the production system and the society that depends upon that system for survival-be made to shoul der those costs? Scientific data about maternal and paternal contri butions to fetal health, moral arguments about the vulnerability of women workers and unborn children, economic analyses o f the po tential cost o f alternative social and industrial policies have all been drawn into the argument. Each has appeared in the service o f the antagonists in this controversy. Each warrants attention. B u t only an analysis that locates these elements in the context o f the clash o f social interests in the struggle over reproductive hazards in the workplace can provide an adequate basis for their understanding.
Fetal R isk, Women Workers, and Corporate Policy: The Rise of a Controversy Exclusionary policies like those o f American Cyanamid have been adopted at many corporations, most notably in the petrochemical sector o f the economy. Am ong those that have moved to bar women from certain jobs are dominant firms such as D upont, General Motors, B. F. Goodrich, O lin, Sun O il, G u lf O il, Union Carbide, Allied Chemical, and Monsanto (<C alifornia L aw Review, 1977; Bertin, 1982) . More importantly, every chemical company surveyed by the trade journal Chemical a n d Engineering News maintained, at least in principle, that no women biologically capable o f bearing children should be exposed to fetotoxins, substances that pose a direct risk to the health and viability o f the unborn child (Rawls, 1980a) . Estimates o f the number o f jobs foreclosed to women because of such policies range upward from a conservative 100,000 (W illiam s, 1981) .
Given the list o f industrial substances with fetotoxic potentialbenzene, lead, vinyl chloride, carbon tetrachloride, and carbon mon oxide, for example (W illiam s, 1981) -the scope o f such exclusions, if consistently applied, would have an extraordinary impact on the ability o f women to work. As many as twenty million jobs-from the labor-intensive craft industry to the technologically advanced sector o f the economy-m ight be involved (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, 1980) . Any effort to extend exclusionary policies to those sectors of the economy, e .g ., the health care industry, where females make up the vast majority o f the labor force, would be especially disruptive to the economy and to the economic well-being o f women workers.
Corporate medical directors, aware of the furor generated by policies that restrict women's employment opportunities, have asserted that such policies do not express a paternalistic concern for the reproductive capacities o f their workers. Bruce Karrh of Dupont stated: "When we remove a woman, it is not to protect her reproductive capacity, but to protect her fetus" (New York T im s, 1981) . Some believe that all fertile women m ust be excluded because of the potential cost of reducing exposure levels to the point at which the fetus would no longer be at risk. Perry J . Gehring, Director o f Health and Envi ronmental Services at Dow Chemical, made this point in justifying his own corporation's perspective: " The difficulty and cost of imple menting good industrial hygiene shouldn't be used as a blanket excuse to exclude women. But if the cost is going to rise exponentially to reach a certain level for uniquely fetal toxins, it's justified to take a woman out o f the workplace then" (W all Street Jo u rn a l, 1979) . Others have adopted a less flexible stance, asserting that since the doseresponse curve for the fetus is unknown, corporations must exclude those who m ight become pregnant. Robert Clyne, formerly Corporate Medical Director at American Cyanamid, argued that in the face of uncertainty no other choice was defensible: "Threshold lim it values for fertile females were arrived at solely by professional and educated guessing and certainly are not based on clinico-laboratory experience. W e adm it that we are ultraconservative" (Bertin, 1982) .
Since so much o f the public interest in exclusionary policies has centered on reports o f elective sterilizations o f women seeking to keep their jobs, representatives o f the corporate world have sought to deny any responsibility for those choices. Jack Kendrik, President o f Bunker H ill, rejected the charges o f corporate critics, asserting: "Certainly no one is required to be sterilized." He found it hard to believe that any woman would have a job-related reason to even contemplate sterilization (G old, 1981) .
The picture is very different for the women who have chosen ster ilization and for their allies in the struggle against corporate exclu sionary policies. For them, a direct line o f responsibility runs from the decision to bar fertile women from jobs to the " choice" of ster ilization. A woman m ight elect, o f course, to accept some lesser assignm ent or the prospect o f a continued job search. But that did not make the situation one o f freedom; rather, such choices were coercively structured. One worker underscored this point by stating: "They don't have to hold a hammer to your head-all they have to do is tell you that it's the only way you can keep your job" (Bertin, 1982) .
Feminists recognized the seriousness o f the challenge represented by the turn toward exclusion. In the journal Feminist Studies, Rosalind Petchesky (1979) argued that the focus on fetal rights had " brought us back to the Victorian notion that woman's childbearing capacityin short, her biology-should determine where and whether she may w ork." For her, the aim o f corporate policy was not to protect the woman worker or her potential child, but was rather to reverse the gains made as a result o f the enactment o f Title VII o f the Civil R ights Act. R esulting from a reassertion o f the sexual division of labor and o f the subordination o f women, the sterilizations o f Willow Island thus became a punishment for the challenge to male occupa tional prerogatives-" a coercively imposed alternative to motherhood" (Petchesky, 1979) .
The empirical bases for exclusionary policies derive from a recog nition o f the special vulnerability o f the developing fetus and from assumptions about the special role o f the maternal contribution to fetal viability and health. Because so little is known about the doseresponse curve for fetotoxicity, some have argued that only a zero level o f exposure can assure safety. Since important aspects o f the developmental process occur in the early weeks after conception, before a woman may know she is pregnant, supporters o f exclusion have also maintained that only the removal o f all fertile women can prevent the accidental exposure o f the fetus (Rawls, 1980) . Though much o f the work on mutagenesis and teratogenesis2 has centered on the maternal role, researchers have shown increasing in terest in the male contribution to negative reproductive outcom es.3 Such concern has focused not only on reduced libido and on sperm production, morphology, and motility (of primary importance to con ception itself), but on mutagenesis as well (Manson and Simons, 2 Mutagenesis involves any negative effect on the genetic material of the male or female germ cell. Teratogenesis, on the other hand, involves a direct harmful impact on the developing organism usually at very early stages of development. J A discussion of the methodological difficulties involved in studying the impact of industrial exposure on male reproductive capacity is found in Murray (1982) ; for discussion of the negative consequences of the toxic exposure of males, see Berg (1979 Berg ( ). 1979 . N egative effects on male gene cells result most often in spon taneous abortions. However, if conception does take place, teratogenic consequences may also occur. For example, some have suggested that semen may serve as a medium for the excretion of chemical agents which may then be absorbed during intercourse through the vaginal mucosa (Council on Environmental Quality, 1981) . Such absorption in a pregnant woman could affect the health o f the embryo or fetus.
After reviewing the evidence, the Council on Environmental Quality concluded that the scientific basis for treating men and women dif ferently, because o f potential reproductive outcomes, was limited. N oting that reproduction involves a wider range o f processes in the female than in the male, the Council stated: "It does not necessarily follow that women are more sensitive to the action o f any given agen t." W hen extensive data were available, as in the cases o f smelter emissions and anesthetic gases, they indicated adverse effects on both women and men; they also showed some evidence o f harm to the fetus following the exposure o f males (Council on Environmental Quality, 1981).
For the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (O SHA), under the leadership o f Eula Bingham , the turn toward exclusionary policies represented a grave assault on the right o f all workers to safe working environments. Especially vulnerable workers could not be barred from worksites that m ight be safe for those within the normal range. As a m atter o f principle, O SH A under the Carter administration had asserted that safety and health standards had to protect even the most vulnerable. Industry had sought to justify its exclusionary prac tices by classing all fertile women and the fetuses o f pregnant women as " hypersusceptibles." To O SH A , both the scientific bases and the logic o f this effort were unacceptable. Unlike those who claimed that the fetus was vulnerable only through maternal exposure, O SH A found the evidence o f paternal effects convincing enough to warrant a chal lenge to conventional assumptions (Bingham , 1980) . Anthony R obbins, Director o f the National Institute o f Occupa tional Safety and H ealth, shared the concerns o f Bingham and her colleagues. In a letter to B. F. Goodrich he wrote: " W e must stand firm on the principle that if an exposure is sufficiently toxic to produce genetic dam age in an unborn child or in a fertile female, then it must be considered to be equally toxic to the fertile male worker and to his unborn child. . . . There is a priori no reason to believe that the genetic material o f a male worker is in any way more resistant to toxic occupational injury than that o f the female" (Rawls, 1980a) .
Any protection required by the fetus because o f its special vulner ability should not be purchased at the expense o f its mother, O SH A believed. Rather, exposure standards had to be set at a level that recognized that vulnerability. Furthermore, reproductive capacity was an element o f a worker's health that should not be endangered by policies m aking childbearing capacity an impediment to employment. A senior policy analyst at O SH A argued: "You do not protect workers by inducing them to harm themselves" (Rawls, 1980a) . Corporate policies that made it possible for a woman to exchange her reproductive capacity for a job-to choose sterilization as a condition for employ ment-were coercive. The conditions of the labor market made elective sterilization voluntary in form only. Eula Bingham dismissed the arguments o f corporate officials who denied any role in workers' de cisions to opt for a surgical end to their childbearing capacities: "No worker m ust be forced to sacrifice his or her right to conceive children in order to hold a job" (Rawls, 1980a) .
Given this perspective, O SH A 's decision to enter the conflict at American Cyanamid was not unexpected. Interpreting the Occupa tional Health and Safety Act broadly, O SH A charged, in October 1979, that the corporation's policies had involved a violation o f the act's general duty clause, which requires that " each employer shall furnish to each o f his employees employment and a place o f employ ment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees ..." (Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1970) . The sterilization, chosen by five women, was a work-related injury to their reproductive ca pacities (Fam ily Planning!Population Reporter. 1981) .
Ten months later W illiam E. Brennan, an administrative law judge o f the Occupational Safety and Health Commission, dismissed O SH A 's citation on technical grounds, asserting that the suit had not been filed in a timely fashion (New York Times, 1980) . The Department o f Labor appealed that decision, but again O SH A lost the case (Sec retary o f Labor v. American Cyanamid, 1981) . In a two to one ruling on April 28, 1981, the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission held that the General Duty clause did not extend to Cyanamid's fetus protection policy. The majority rejected the contention that O SH A 's mandate, which protected the physical integrity o f em ployees " while they are engaged in work-related activities," could be extended to elective sterilization. Unlike those who viewed the choice o f sterilization as the product o f corporate policy, the majority held that a worker's decision to give up her ability to bear children in order to retain her job "grows out o f economic and social factors which operate prim arily outside the workplace. The employer neither controls nor creates those factors. ..." In a stinging dissent, one commissioner held that the majority had made an unduly re strictive interpretation of the O SH Act and thereby had placed American workers beyond the protection of the law. "One fact is inescapable in this case. Five American Cyanamid employees have been sterilized. As a matter o f law, this irreversible termination of their childbearing capacities is a material impairment o f functional capacity resulting from a condition o f employment imposed by their em ployer." Rejecting the logic o f the majority, the dissent could see no distinction between the fetus protection policy and the willful exposure o f workers to toxic substances. "Corporate policy that offers employees a choice between jobs and surgical sterilization is com parable to corporate policy that offers employees a choice between jobs and exposure to sterilizing chem icals." Both the letter and the spirit o f the act prohibited the former as certainly as they prohibited the latter.
The Government's Reaction: Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards
Confronted with the emergence of exclusionary policies and practices, fearful o f their extension to broader sectors of the economy, and responding to the pressure o f their natural political constituencies, the Equal Em ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), and the Occu pational Safety and Health Administration began discussions about an appropriate regulatory response. At stake was the complex question o f fashioning a policy directive that was mindful o f the imperatives of the Civil Rights Act's protection of women, and legislative mandates regarding the protection o f the health and safety of all workers. On February 1, 1980, EEO C and OFCCP issued their Interpretative Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards. These guidelines were explicitly set against a background o f earlier expressions o f concern by EEOC and O SH A 's administrator, Eula Bingham , regarding the discriminatory impact o f corporate policies that sought to exclude all fertile women from certain jobs in the name o f reproductive and fetal health. Designed to provide employers, contractors, and the general public with "policy guidance" consistent with civil rights law, the guidelines sought to restrict severely the circumstances under which women could be denied employment be cause o f their childbearing capacities. By posing a challenge to the emerging pattern of corporate policy, the guidelines sought to provide women workers with institutional support for their efforts to roll back what was perceived as a threat to hard-won employment rights.
Underlying the approach o f the guidelines to the issue o f repro ductive hazards in the workplace was a profound skepticism about the scientific justification for exclusionary practices that sought to protect the unborn child exclusively through restrictions on the em ployment o f fertile women. Unlike those who argued that the weight o f scientific evidence made clear the necessity o f protecting the fetus through the mother, the guidelines held out the importance o f paying due heed to the paternal contribution to negative reproductive out comes. Given this assumption on the part o f the drafters o f the guidelines, it followed quite naturally that policies directed at women alone would be unacceptable. " I f the hazard is known to affect the fetus through either parent, an exclusionary policy directed only at women would be unlawful under Title VII [of the Civil R ights A ct}" (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Office o f Federal Contract Compliance Programs, 1981) .
There was a further and perhaps more striking rejection o f the assumptions underlying corporate exclusionary policies. The guidelines rejected the proposition that even in those instances where it could be shown that the protection o f the fetus required the exclusion of the mother, a policy restricting the work o f all fertile women was necessary. W omen workers were not to be treated as if they had no control over their reproductive functions. They were not to be treated as if their potential for pregnancy rendered them functionally, per petually pregnant. Henceforth, it would be only permissible to fashion narrowly tailored exclusionary policies. Only pregnant women m ight be the target o f such protective actions. But even these practices would be countenanced only as a last resort. Among the elements that would be considered in the evaluation of corporate behavior were: the firm's record with respect to all applicable occupational safety and health regulations; its thoroughness in considering all scientifically recognized reproductive hazards-as they m ight affect both men and women-in the formulation o f employment policies; the degree to which the excluded class o f workers was at significantly greater risk than the nonexcluded class; the likelihood, based on available evidence, that members o f the nonexcluded class would not suffer injury to their general health as a result o f exposure to the toxic substance in question; the extent to which the employer had examined and at tempted to implement alternatives to exclusion; and the firm's overall record with regard to gender-based discrimination. These criteria underscored two points o f radical disagreement between the authors o f the guidelines and those who had justified the exclusion o f fertile women. First, reproductive hazards were not to be considered more significant than other occupational harms. Second, the potential risk to the fetus was not to be treated more seriously than risks to re productive capacity itself. Fetal priority was thus dislodged.
Reflecting a preference for policies targeted at the production process itself, rather than at particularly susceptible workers, the guidelines stressed the implementation o f engineering controls, the use of pro tective devices, and the elimination of fetotoxic substances, where possible. Finally, the guidelines recommended serious consideration of medical transfer by which workers shifted from settings that could result in fetal harm would retain seniority, wage, and benefit levels. Such a practice modeled after O SH A's Lead Standard Medical Removal Protection (M RP) policy would protect the worker against a loss of earning power, the fetus against harm, and the corporation against liability. The cost o f such a practice would act as an incentive to innovation.
Although the guidelines were based on the assumption that a full scientific inquiry into the fetotoxic consequences of worker exposure would reveal paternal as well as maternal contributions, they ac knowledged that current data m ight support the conventional view with its stress on female workers. Studies had rarely examined the effects o f paternal exposure, assum ing at the outset that only the mechanisms o f harm to the fetus through maternal exposure required investigation. As a temporary measure, therefore, EEOC and OFCCP were willing to consider the exclusion o f pregnant women pending further research. But in such instances the guidelines mandated that new research be undertaken to uncover the possible detrimental con sequences o f paternal exposure. Two years were to be allowed for such studies, the cost o f which was to be borne by corporations. When the cost o f underwriting research became too great a burden, the corporations could call on O SH A and the National 1979) .
The official call for responses to the proposed regulations elicited a flood of formal reactions on the part o f corporations, trade groups, labor unions, women's rights groups, and civil liberties organizations.4 These statements reveal a bitter and divisive clash o f social interests in the struggle over private and public policy toward reproductive hazards in the workplace. They reveal, in a striking fashion, the way in which moral arguments reflect social interests. They reveal the political topography o f moral discourse.
Public Response to the Guidelines: The Clash o f Social Interests
The comments subm itted by corporations and industrial associations challenged every element o f the proposed regulatory effort. Among those responding to the guidelines were the U .S. Chamber o f Com merce, the American Industrial Health Association, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Asso ciation, the Lead Industries Association, and the Battery Council. Powerful corporations such as American Telephone and Telegraph, General Motors, D upont, Dow Chemical, Exxon, Shell O il, and Union Carbide also joined the attack on the proposed regulations. Pledging their support for equal employment opportunity and occupational health and safety, these respondents stressed that exclusionary practices should be relied upon only as a final resort, following efforts at 4 The following references are taken from the formal comments submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. All comments are on file at the commission in Washington, D.C. engineering and administrative controls, the modification o f work practices, and the use o f personal protective equipment. Yet they saw the guidelines as profoundly flawed because, as Exxon asserted, they would " significantly enhance reproductive hazards in the workplace, greatly increase the cost o f industry-sponsored medical research and testing, and expand certain areas o f tort liability of employers subject to com pliance."
From the perspective o f business, the government's attem pt to fashion an adequate response to reproductive hazards in the workplace had foundered because o f the refusal o f EEOC and OFCCP to ac knowledge that teratogenesis was the consequence of the special and unique relationship between mother and fetus (Dow Chemical Com pany). Indeed, the effort to equate the potential paternal contribution to negative reproductive outcomes and the maternal contribution to embryo-and fetotoxicity was a fundamental error (Monsanto Cor poration). And so the corporations repeatedly criticized and ridiculed the scientific pretensions and misconceptions that informed the guidelines.
The decision to allow for only narrowly tailored exclusions was termed " unconscionable" (Monsanto Corporation) and " morally irre sponsible" (General Motors Corporation). By permitting fertile women, who m ight be pregnant, to work in toxic environments, the regu lations were virtually assuring the unintended exposure of the embryo and fetus to hazards in the workplace (Chemical Manufacturers A s sociation). Business interests repeatedly characterized the fetus as the unprotected victim o f this shift in public policy and placed the claims o f this " uninvited visitor" (Equal Employment Advisory Council) above those o f the mother/worker. It was the mother/worker's obli gation to provide " room and board" (Ethyl Corporation) and a " safe and healthy prenatal environment" for the fetus (Borg & Warner Chemicals); she could not exchange her concern for a job for its interest in health, safety, and life (Ethyl Corporation). The Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association expressed in dramatic terms the underlying business assum ption about the disjunction between the interests o f the mother/worker and her biological charge: "Since the fetus derives no prim ary benefit from its unknown or known presence in the workplace, it should not be exposed to excessive risks. . . . This is a sm all price for mothers, potential mothers, and society to pay. ..."
Because the guidelines sought to preclude corporate intervention on behalf o f the fetus, they were characterized as paying undue attention to the concern o f women about discrimination (Air Products & Chem icals Incorporated). EEO C and O FCCP had sacrificed the rights of the fetus and had endangered the well-being o f future generations. There was sim ply no justification for subsum ing a policy on repro ductive hazards under T itle VII o f the Civil R ights Act (Shell Oil Company). Since exclusionary policies were based upon scientific and medical rather than social considerations, they could not be, by def inition, discriminatory acts. T o claim that fetal protection policies involved the abrogation o f the federally guaranteed rights o f women represented a disregard o f congressional intent and would fasten the Civil R ights Act to policies with terrible consequences for the nation and humanity (Monsanto).
Corporations reacted with dismay to the stipulation that employers who took advantage o f temporary emergency exclusion provisions engage in research into the male contribution to fetal harm. The Chamber o f Commerce asserted that such scientific work would place impossible burdens on many companies. Indeed, most small businesses could not afford and were totally unequipped for such tasks. Further, it was unreasonable to assume that the investigations could be com pleted within the mandated two years (Chamber o f Commerce). The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, for example, estimated that such studies m ight be expected to take 56 months. One company, using the widely accepted assumption that the full testing o f one chemical for mutagenic and teratogenic consequences would cost be tween $ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 and $ 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 (Chemical Manufacturers Association), calculated that its research obligation could reach a staggering $1.4 billion (N A LC O Chemical Company)! W hat made this research requirement all the more unacceptable to the corporations was its unscientific premises. N othing suggested that the failure to engage in balanced testing had resulted in a distorted picture o f teratogenic outcomes (American Petroleum Institute). Social and not scientific considerations were being used to evaluate the adequacy o f reproductive research. Political pressure was attem pting to force useless expenditures on research into fetal harm (American Petroleum Institute). "N o amount o f legislation or regulation can equalize the risks associated with the reproductive cycle" (Pennzoil Company).
In addition to attacking these guidelines-mandated research costs, virtually every business response to the proposed regulations under scored the potential for tort liability that would follow the prohibition on excluding all fertile--as opposed to pregnant-women from fetotoxic environments. Since the exposed mother could not waive her potential child's right to sue for dam ages resulting from her exposure in the workplace, employers would confront a potentially ruinous tide of suits. If federal agencies sought " to expose employers to that kind of devastating tort liability ," argued the Lead Industries Association, "Congress should enact legislation protecting companies from both legal expenses and the economic consequences of such su its." Congress could not be expected to provide such guarantees. And so, the American Petroleum Institute threatened that employers would have no alternative but to engage in endless litigation against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission rather than face the costs of liability to future plaintiffs.
Added to the costs associated with potential liability suits and enforced research would be those tied to the requirement that " fea sible" alternatives to the exclusion o f pregnant women be explored before relying on so extreme an option. Alert to the nuances of language in the battle over occupational health and safety standards, corporate respondents saw the choice o f " feasible" over "practicable" as indicating that federal bureaucrats would not permit reasonable cost considerations to play a role in determining the appropriateness of a given policy (Exxon).
In sum , these potential burdens upon business m ight lead to the avoidance o f those production processes involving the use o f fetotoxic substances, curtailm ent o f business activity, and a concomitant loss o f jobs. Ironically, regulations designed to expand employment op portunities for women would reduce the employment opportunities for both women and men (Chamber o f Commerce).
Finally, employers stressed that both EEOC and OFCCP had over extended themselves, going far beyond their congressionally mandated rule-making authority. The guidelines represented yet one more in stance o f an ill-advised attem pt by government to force complex issues into a rigid regulatory framework (Mechanical Contractors Association o f America). And here the issues were so delicate that the intrusion o f regulators could only be morally reprehensible. " Under what cirumstances should the mother's interest supplant those o f the unborn child? Under what circumstances should the child's interest take pre cedence? W ho has the legitim ate claim to decide this profound moral and legal question? The mother? The federal government? The em ployers? It seems that the entity with the least claim is the federal government" (Borg-W arner) .
N ot only were the guidelines attacked by the corporate sector, which viewed them as an unwelcome effort by W ashington to impose a regulatory regim e, but they were also criticized by the opponents o f corporate exclusionary policy. These challenges were o f a very different sort, however, reflecting concern over what was seen as the too lim ited scope o f the proposals. In the face o f an assault on the rights o f women workers, the guidelines were too am biguous, too tim id.
Most important was the statement o f the Coalition for the Repro ductive R ights o f W orkers (C R R O W ), representing a broad-based expression o f antagonism toward all sex-based exclusionary practices. W ith explicit reference to T itle VII o f the Civil R ights A ct, CRRO W argued that neither Bona Fide Occupational Qualification nor Business Necessity Defense5-the two major defenses to charges o f employment discrimination-could be used to justify excluding fertile women because o f reproductive hazards. C R R O W applauded the thrust of the guidelines, and their explicit link to T itle VII, but feared that because o f vague language they m ight be interpreted to permit the exclusion o f a pregnant woman " to protect employers against liability should her child be born in some way deform ed." Especially troubling was the framing o f the temporary emergency exclusion provision. For C R R O W , even the most narrowly tailored policy o f exclusion required the full retention o f earnings and seniority for affected workers, as in the Medical Removal Protection requirement of O SH A's Lead Standard. W ithout the enactment o f such mandatory protections, CRRO W asserted, it could not support the guidelines.
5 When an employer adopts an employment practice that explicitly discrim inates against women, that practice may be defended by arguing that gender bears a direct relationship to the capacity of women to perform given jobs. For example, refusing to hire women as models in a men's clothing store could be defended on the basis of Bona Fide Occupational Qualification. The Business Necessity Defense, on the other hand, is a judicially created doctrine and only comes to bear when employment practices that are not explicitly discriminatory have a disparate impact on women. Under these circumstances the employer must show that there is a demonstrable relationship between the challenged job criterion and successful performance.
These argum ents were buttressed by the W omen's R ights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). W hile not denying the potential for serious risk to fetal health as a result of parentalbut especially maternal-exposure, the ACLU asserted that these risks had been overstated in order to justify exclusions. " W e believe that the risk o f birth defects is miniscule in most instances, and that there is a greater likelihood of miscarriage, infertility, and other similar reproductive anom alies." Indeed, the risks from smoking and alcohol consumption were probably greater, though no one had dared to interfere with the rights o f pregnant women to consume these sub stances. G oing beyond C R R O W 's insistence upon the maintenance of income and seniority rights for those who were at risk and who sought transfer or temporary leave during pregnancy or while at tem pting to conceive, the W om en's R ights Project suggested that a libertarian com m itm ent required more than protection. Most women, the A C LU claim ed, would elect transfer with job and income security if informed o f the risks to their pregnancies or fetuses. Yet some m ight choose to accept such risks, and they should be permitted to do so. Such freedom o f choice would enhance workers' options. By contrast, the alternatives made available by corporations such as American Cyanam id were coercive; they were but the faintest im ita tions o f freedom.
Finally, the A C LU responded to the corporate concern over potential tort liability by noting that companies using toxic substances had to contend with the possibility o f suits by those living near their factories, as well as by male workers who believed that workplace exposure had resulted in birth defects in their children. W ith so many potential sources o f liability, it was unacceptable to select one-fertile womenfor elimination in the name of corporate fiscal security. Certainly, corporations could seek to insure themselves against liability here as they did in other cases. But more importantly, the ACLU "adamantly oppose [d] the proposition that [the avoidance o f tort liability] may be [achieved] at the expense o f workers' federally guaranteed rights to equality."
Trade unions representing workers in industries with exclusionary policies responded forcefully to the guidelines, often acknowledging their support for C R R O W 's position. The tone of the union remarks conveys outrage over the discrepancy between corporate concern for the fetus, yet insensitivity to the survival interests of women workers.
For the United Steelworkers, corporate exclusionary policies re flected not only selfish economic considerations, but the very sex stereotyping that civil rights laws were designed to restrict. Those who demanded the exclusion o f all fertile women refused to acknowl edge the ability o f female workers to make responsible judgm ents. " It does not matter if the woman has chosen not to have a family, if her sexual partner has a vasectomy, or if she is practicing birth control." For the protection o f profits, "corporations sought to create a 'liability-free' workplace." And the cost o f creating such an en vironment was to be borne by the women who would be compelled to leave their jobs in order to preserve their abilities to bear children, by the women who would be denied employment in the first place. W hy, asked the Steelworkers, had concern for a work environment free o f reproductive hazards emerged only in settings that until recently had barred women? In the health care sector, where exclusion would require the replacement o f virtually the total work force, either little fuss was made about reproductive risks or engineering controls were used to lim it harmful exposure. The proposed guidelines were in adequate in the face o f such an intolerable attack on the rights of women workers. Instead o f asserting the unacceptability o f all exclu sionary policies, the provision for temporary emergency exclusion would provide a "good housekeeping seal" for inroads into equal employment.
Like the Steelworkers, the Autoworkers and the International Chem ical W orkers Union (ICW U) asserted that, despite the rhetoric of morality and the professed concern for the unborn, exclusionary pol icies were at root designed to protect corporate profits. The " moral imperative" o f protecting the fetus was merely a "clever deception" (ICW U). Only medical removal protection was an acceptable option. W ithout denying that adoption o f M RP would involve a financial burden for corporations, IC W U viewed such costs as preferable to the " more drastic and demonstrably tragic consequences o f exclusion." Finally, the O il, Chemical and Atomic Workers (O CAW ), the union representing the workers at American Cyanamid, asserted that its experience with that " most belligerent employer" led it to conclude that the proposed guidelines were " completely unacceptable." For O C A W , the only remedy for exclusion was an ironclad prohibition on gender-based hiring and work assignments. Mandatory adoption o f medical removal protection policies could be used to safeguard the interests o f workers while modifications in the production process were being im plemented.
Trade union and feminist criticism was echoed in the remarks of key governmental bodies. Both O SH A and the National Institute o f Occupational Safety and Health argued against temporary emergency exclusion and for medical removal protection. O f state agencies con cerned with fair employment practices and occupational health and safety, surprisingly few subm itted comments. Those that did shared O SH A 's dissatisfactions ( e .g ., the California Department o f Industrial Relations, Division o f Occupational Safety and Health, and the A t torney General o f Massachusetts).
There were, to be sure, some comments on the proposed guidelines that saw in them a laudable effort at meeting the legitim ate claims both o f women threatened by exclusionary policies and o f those con cerned with the full range o f reproductive hazards, including fetal health and viability (e .g ., the American Nurses Association and the Illinois Com m ission on the Status o f W omen). B u t these were strik ingly in the minority. W ith the corporate world demanding with drawal o f the guidelines because they went too far and pro-feminist and trade union groups dem anding that they be amended and strength ened, they were extremely vulnerable and would have faced an un certain future in any event. The election o f a conservative national administration hostile to the direction o f O SH A policy under Eula Bingham , sympathetic to business interests, and committed to an antiregulatory posture, guaranteed that the EEOC and OFCCP effort would meet resistance. The decision by the Reagan government, within one month o f its inauguration, to withdraw the proposed guide lines thus came as no surprise.
Reproductive Burdens and Public Policy W ith the prospects for a regulatory prohibition on exclusionary policies foreclosed, litigation under the Civil R ights Act remains the primary avenue available for those who seek to thwart corporate policy. Given a conservative political clim ate, however, it is unlikely that the courts will assume an aggressively profeminist and prolabor stance in this complex arena where administrative guidance is lacking and where the scientific issues are so problematical. Confronted by a challenge against the Olin Corporation, for example, a federal district court in N orth Carolina ruled in December 1980 that a fetal protection policy did not violate T itle VII o f the Civil R ights Act because it was " instituted for social and humane reasons, and [was] based upon sound medical knowledge and research" (Fam ily Planning!Population Reporter, 1981) . That case is now before the U .S . Court o f Appeals for the 4th Circuit. In the O lin and American Cyanamid cases as well as in others presently under litigation, the issues involve the conflict between policies explicitly directed at protecting the fetus and provisions of the Civil R ights Act. Especially relevant are those amendments to the law that were enacted to lim it labor practices which treated pregnancy differently from other medical conditions. The question central to these cases will be whether the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification and the Manifest Business Necessity defenses to charges of discrimination should be available as justifications for the exclusion o f all fertile women from certain jobs. Since these carefully fashioned doctrines were designed to lim it employment discrimination, making job performance the sole legitim ate criterion o f selection, considerable controversy has emerged among legal scholars about their applicability to practices directed at protecting the fetus (W illiam s, 1981; Howard, 1981; Furnish, 1980) . The judicial forum within which the issue o f exclusionary policies is now being debated will force the conflict to take on a special character, tied to the language o f current civil rights statutes. Beyond the legal issues, yet constitutive of them, is a broad and important sociopolitical question: W ho ought to bear the burden o f protecting the potential children o f workers from the mutagenic and teratogenic risks associated with workplace exposure?
Ironically, in attem pting to answer this question, both corporations and opponents o f exclusionary practices seem to have reversed their characteristic positions on risk assessment and its implications for industrial policy. Typically, workers and their representatives have pressed management for the most extensive reductions in exposure levels to toxic substances. Further, they have maintained that uncer tainty requires the most cautious assumptions about the possibility o f harmful consequences. Corporations have responded by arguing that a risk-free environment is a chimerical notion and that the existence o f uncertainty requires a willingness to tolerate levels o f exposure that have not been proven harmful. Yet in relation to reproductive hazards and, more especially, danger to the fetus, it is labor and its allies that have viewed with some skepticism the data on potential risk. Corporations, on the other hand, have adopted an almost alarmist perspective. W hat accounts for this reversal; for the interventionist stance o f corporations with regard to the decisions that m ight be made by their female workers under conditions of possible risk; for the tendency o f some unions, fem inists, and political liberals to minimize the level o f risk posed to the fetus directly through the mother, and hence to favor less restrictive employment practices?
When corporations argue that fetal protection requires absolute safety, that the cost o f reducing workplace exposure so as to achieve such protection is too great to bear, that the widespread application of medical removal policies to men and women planning families would result in staggering expenditures, that the possibility o f tort liability is potentially ruinous, those statements must be read as attem pts to shift the economic burdens associated with childbearing in risky settings to those who may be temporarily or permanently deprived o f jobs. W hen trade unions and feminist groups demand that fertile women and men be permitted to work in settings that may carry some risk, that corporations reduce the level o f exposure to mutagenic and teratogenic substances so that the most vulnerable are protected, that workers planning families be provided with medical removal protection when there is an immediate prospect of harm, that tort suits be available to those who, despite protective efforts, bear defective children, such statements m ust be understood as claims on the disposable resources o f those who own and manage businesses and on society as a whole.
Inevitably, public policy will determine the relative burdens to be assumed by workers, business, and the broader society. The com parative strength and influence o f workers and business will determine the outcome in this instance, as it does in every conflict over occu pational health and safety. The state may act, as it had done recently, by adopting a laissez-faire posture. But such a course will be neutral in form only. The pattern o f American social advance generally has involved attem pts by relatively disadvantaged groups and classes to mobilize the authority o f government against the overwhelming strength o f those with social power. The defense of laissez faire is the defense o f those who can achieve their ends without the direct in tervention o f government. In the conflict over exclusionary policies, women and their allies sought to thwart corporate practices with the aid o f W ashington. Employers opposed regulatory control as unwar ranted and counterproductive. In a period marked by high unem ployment and trade union vulnerability, there will be a few surprises as the state stands to the side while the clash over reproductive hazards takes place.
The outcome will be neither just nor effective. It will place the cost and burden o f coping with reproductive hazards in the workplace upon women alone. And, ironically, because o f its exclusive focus on female workers, it will fail to achieve the important social goal of protecting the unborn from work-related harm.
In recent years women have entered the labor market in unprece dented numbers. In large measure they have done so because o f the pressures o f economic life in the United States. Only recently have they succeeded in m aking inroads into well-paying jobs that formerly had been barred to them by law, tradition, and practice. Women therefore represent a vulnerable segment o f the workforce, one that deserves special protections. Policies that may hinder or reverse their advance, however inadvertantly, m ust be subject to close scrutiny.
Though the scientific evidence is clouded with uncertainties, it seems clear that corporate policies attem pting to lim it negative re productive outcomes exclusively through restrictions on the working lives o f fertile women will have only partial success at best. A com m itm ent to the reproductive health o f workers and to the health and viability o f their potential offspring will require work practices and social policies that consider the phasing o f both maternal and paternal contributions to fetal health. Such measures will necessitate the rec ognition o f periods-not always the same for men and women-of special vulnerability that require removal from toxic settings. But for such removal to be acceptable, the economic security o f workers planning to have children will need protection.
O f course, significant risks and social costs would attend such policies. There will remain the problem o f unplanned pregnancies among sexually active workers that may result in embryonic and fetal exposure. But to lim it the employment opportunities o f all fertile workers because of the potential for such accidents seems extreme and unwarranted. The costs o f protecting the offspring o f workers through a policy o f medical removal protection would not be insignificant. But if the health o f the fetus is to be a central public concern, no other solution seems appropriate. T o make private the burden o f childbearing under hazardous working conditions by forcing workers to assume the costs through job loss or income reduction would involve a profound injustice. To make private the acceptance o f sig nificantly increased risk to fetal health by viewing such a choice as belonging to potential parents alone would represent a serious mistake. Reproductive hazards in the workplace are a social problem. They require a social solution.
D espite the sharp opposition between women and the corporate defenders o f exclusion, they share an important though unspoken appreciation o f the conditions o f working-class life and the options available to blue-collar women. Both recognize that, given a chance, women would be w illing to assume risks in order to improve or at least retain their earning capacities. In the name o f equal opportunity, the defenders o f women's rights have demanded the freedom to take on those risks. In the name o f fetal health, corporations have sought to restrict the liberty o f working women. U niting the two sides of the conflict over reproductive hazards in the workplace is an awareness that the American economy so lim its the possibilities of its women workers that they would demand-as a sign o f liberation-the right to share with men equal access to reproductive risks. The appreciation o f this fact explains the disquiet that informs the analyses of the most thoughtful antagonists o f exclusionary policies. It gives the story of five women at American Cyanamid an irreducibly tragic dimension.
